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ABSTRACT  
The paper tackles the job creation issue with respect to the 
framework of labour market policies implemented in Algeria since the 
late 1990s, in particular in 1997 and 2008. First, the sharp decline in 
unemployment rate and high elasticity vis-à-vis the GDP growth rate 
question the relevance of Okun's law. Second, the quantitative impact 
in terms of job creation is assessed as regards three employment 
schemes: intermediation on the labour market, safety net job creation 
and the effect of entrepreneurship promotion upon employment 
within SMEs. Third, the interplay between rising informal 
employment and unemployment decline before and after 2008, is 
addressed thanks to a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) experiment 
testing informal wage employment as well as informal businesses. 
The overall impact of employment policy schemes proves weak upon 
both the unemployment rate and informal employment. Informal 
employment stands as a cheap substitute for formal employment. 
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LOI D’OKUN, CHOMAGE ET EMPLOI INFORMEL EN 
ALGERIE : L’IMPACT DES POLITIQUES DU MARCHÉDU 
TRAVAIL DEPUIS 1997 
RÉSUMÉ 
L’article aborde l’enjeu de la création d'emplois dans le cadre des 
politiques du marché du travail mises en œuvre en Algérie depuis la 
fin des années 1990, notamment en 1997 et 2008. Premièrement, la 
forte baisse du taux de chômage et la forte élasticité vis-à-vis du taux 
de croissance du PIB questionne la pertinence de la loi d'Okun. 
Deuxièmement, l'impact quantitatif en termes de création d'emplois 
est évalué pour trois régimes d'emploi: l'intermédiation sur le marché 
du travail, la création d'emplois de sauvegarde et l'effet de la 
promotion de l'entrepreneuriat sur l'emploi dans les PME. 
Troisièmement, l'interaction entre la hausse de l'emploi informel et la 
baisse du chômage avant et après 2008 est abordée grâce à une 
expérimentation DiD (Difference-in-Difference) qui teste l'emploi 
salarié informel ainsi que les entreprises informelles. L'impact global 
des programmes de politique de l'emploi s’avère faible tant sur le taux 
de chômage que sur l'emploi informel. L’emploi informel constitue un 
substitut peu coûteux à l’emploi formel. 
MOTS-CLÉS : 
Algérie, chômage, DiD, emploi informel, loi d'Okun, politiques du 
marché du travail. 
JEL CLASSIFICATION:E26; J46; J48. 
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اثر سياسات سوق - قانون أوكن، البطالة و العمل غير الرسمي في الجزائر
 1997العمل منذ 
: ملخص
يتناول املقال موضوع خلق فرص العمل يف إطار  سياسات سوق العمل املطبقة يف 
االخنفاض : أواًل . 2008 و 1997اجلزائر منذ هناية التسعينيات ، ال سيما يف عامي 
احلاد يف معدل البطالة و املرونة القوية ملعدل منو الناتج احمللي اإلمجايل يشككان يف أمهية 
يتم تقييم األثر الكمي من حيث خلق فرص العمل حسب ثالث : ثانيا. قانون أوكن
تأثري  الوساطة يف سوق العمل، خلق  مناصب عمل احتياطية و: مراحل للتوظيف
تتم معاجلة : ثالثًا . تشجيع ريادة األعمال على التوظيف يف املؤسسات الصغرية واملتوسطة
 من خالل 2008التفاعل بني ارتفاع العمالة غري الرمسية واخنفاض البطالة قبل وبعد عام 
 اليت ختترب العمل  (Difference-in-Difference DID) جتربة فرق االختالف
اتضح أن األثر العام لربامج سياسة . املأجور غري الرمسي وكذلك املؤسسات غري الرمسية
إذن العمالة غري الرمسية . التوظيف ضعيف على كل من معدل البطالة والعمالة غري الرمسية
. هي بديل غري مكلف للعمل الرمسي
:  كلمات مفتاحية
اجلزائر، البطالة، فرق االختالف، العمل غري الرمسي، قانون أوكن، سياسات سوق 
. العمل








We assess labour market policies conducted in Algeria since the 
implementation in 1997 of a first set of schemesfighting 
unemployment and poverty. To our best knowledge, no impact 
assessment of such policies has been yet carried out (Musette, 
2013;Benhabib 2017). 
Rising unemployment rate over 1987-1997 followed the fall in oil 
prices and the Structural Adjustment Plan (1994-1997), which 
generated some400,000 job losses in state-owned enterprises in 1998 
(Musette et al., 2003). Peaking in 2000 (almost 30%), the trend in 
unemployment reverted and dropped to 10-11% from 2009 to 2016 
(ONS, 2012, 2017); meanwhile, the rise in oil prices fueled the increase 
in both export earnings and public expenditure throughout three 
plans: 2001-2004, 2005-2009 and 2010-2014. 
The OECD (2015) designed a threefold typology that fits active 
labour market policies in Algeria: support for business creation or 
self-employment, professional inclusion with fixed-term contracts or 
temporary jobs, and training and job search assistance for the 
unemployed in order to improve access to the labour market. 
According to Musette (2013) this typology uncovers into three 
generations. The first generation (1989-1997) attempts to mitigate the 
negative shock of the Structural Adjustment Plan upon the labour 
market, thanks to several agencies: the National Unemployment 
Insurance Fund (CNAC) established in 1994grants unemployment 
benefits to laid-off workers and since 2003, alongside with ANSEJ, 
supports the creation of small businesses by redundant workers aged 
35-50. The Social Development Agency (ADS) established in 1995 is in 
charge of alleviating poverty. The National Youth Employment 
Support Agency (ANSEJ) established in 1997supports small business 
creation by young entrepreneurs aged 19-35. During the second 
generation (1998-2007), the National Employment Agency (ANEM) 
adjusts vacancies and labour supply and the National Agency for 
Microcredit Management (ANGEM) provides subsidised credit to 
Les Cahiers du Cread, vol. 33 - n° 123 
133 
 
small businesses, both established in 2004. The third generation starts 
in 2008 with the implementation of the Action Plan promoting 
employment and fighting unemployment (hereafter Action Plan), 
bringing in incentives for employers and social security coverage for 
employees, enhancing temporary jobs and enforcing compliance with 
tax and labour regulations, in view of formalizing the informal sector. 
Our question is threefold: to what extent are changes in 
unemployment the outcome of economic growth, the activation of 
employment policies, or the substitution of informal employment to 
formal employment? 
The paper is structured as follows. Section two tackles the 
relevance of Okun's law in Algeria, decomposing the relationship 
between economic growth and employment as well as labour 
productivity and work force. Section three estimates the impact upon 
jobs creation from three employment schemes: supply and demand 
adjustment on the labour market, safety net jobs and promoting 
microenterprises. Section four focuses on the interplay between 
informal employment and unemployment decline before and after 
2008.Section five is devoted to the conclusion and discussion. Section 
six sketches policy recommendations. 
2- THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT: 
HOW RELEVANT IS OKUN'S LAW IN ALGERIA? 
2.1- Demography and labour market trends: some stylized facts 
We first present some stylized facts drawn from the data in Table 
A1 (See Appendix 1). 
The employment rate increases by 10% between 2000 and 2014, 
while the working-age population increases by only 4.6%. The change 
in the employment rate accelerates until 2005 and then declines until 
2012. The change in the working-age population declines 
continuously and becomes negative from 2010. Hence, there is a 
potentially virtuous demographic effect upon unemployment. 
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The working-age population is stabilizing, the working population 
is rising with the increase in the employed population and the 
number of unemployed is dramatically dropping from 2,511 million 
in 2000 to 1,241 million in 2006 and 1,072 million in 2009. The 
unemployment rate almost reached 30% in 2000, dropped to 20% in 
2004 and 10% in 2009. Over the period 2001-2015, the average annual 
increase in the employed population nearly amounts to 300,000 
workers (290,000) and the decline in unemployment benefits nearly 
100,000 people (-98,000) per annum. It is worth noticing the fall in 
unemployment occurs before the implementation of the 2008 Action 
Plan 
2.2- Labour force, labour productivity, unemployment and GDP: Okun’s 
law  
Okun's law (Box 1) proves controversial, with respect to two 
strands of literature addressing the relationship between economic 
growth and unemployment in Algeria. 
Box 1. Two specifications of Okun’s law 
Okun's law covers two specifications: the first difference model 
and the gap model. 
According to the first difference model, the relationship between 
the logarithm of the actual observed output (y) and the observed 
unemployment rate (u) is expressed by: 
(𝑢𝑡−𝑢𝑡−1)=𝛼+ (𝑦𝑡−𝑦𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡. Hence, Δ𝑢𝑡=𝛼+𝛽Δ𝑦𝑡+𝜀𝑡. 
𝛽 corresponds to the Okun coefficient, which measures the 
elasticity of unemployment to GDP. 
According to the gap model, the relationship between the observed 
unemployment gap (u𝑡) to the natural unemployment rate (u*𝑡) and 
the difference between observed GDP (𝑦𝑡) and potential GDP (𝑦*𝑡) is 
expressed by: (𝑢𝑡-𝑢*𝑡) = α + γ (𝑦𝑡-𝑦*𝑡) + ω𝑡. 
γ corresponds here to the Okun coefficient. 
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The problem with the gap model is that y*and u* are not 
observable and must be estimated. The estimation requires smoothing 
(e.g. Hodrick-Prescott filter) in order to impute the trend and cyclic 
components of these two variables respectively. 
The elasticity coefficient is assumed to be negative and less than 1. 
Okun's law would be verified in the long term (Ball et al., 2017). 
Labour productivity and the labour force are decisive factors. 
Source: Authors 
The first strand includes two studies claiming that Okun's law 
does not exist under the gap model.  
Yousefat (2011) uses an error-correction model (henceforth ECM) 
over the period 1970-2009 and concludes that there is a low causality 
of unemployment upon economic growth; however, no balancing 
relationship shows upeitherin the long or short term.  
Driouche (2013), also using an ECM over the period 1980-2011 to 
determine the growth rate required to absorb long-term 
unemployment, concludes that there is no co-integration relationship 
between unemployment rate and economic growth. 
The second strand gathers three other studiesclaiming thatOkun's 
law is valid. 
Furceri (2012) explores the impact of labour market institutions on 
the relationship between unemployment and growth over the period 
1980-2008. He observes a negative relationship between employment 
and the output gap. The Okun coefficient appears low (-0.05) due to 
the preponderance of industriesexperiencinglow employment growth 
(hydrocarbons) and the rigidity of the labour market characterized by 
the opposition of insiders and outsiders. 
Adouka and Bouguell (2013) use an ECM validatingOkun's law 
over the period 1980-2010: a 1% increase in real GDP around its 
potential GDP results in a 0.2% decline in the unemployment rate. 
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El Aynaoui and Ibourk (2016) test Okun's law on a sample of 39 
countries during the period 1991-2015. They validate the gap model in 
the case of Algeria for which a 1% growth reduces unemployment, 
approximately, in the same proportion. 
However, any increase in GDP does not necessarily imply a fall in 
unemployment due to the variation in labour productivity and the 
labour force, which is the sum of the growth rate needed to alleviate 
the unemployment rate. This growth rate can stand as a first 
approximation of the growth rate of potential GDP. 
According to Figure 1, during the period 2001-2015, the annual 
average change in labour  productivity is 0.1526% and it fluctuates in 
line with real GDP up to 2010, while the change in the labour force is 
1.644% and fluctuates in line with the unemployment rate until 2010. 
The annual average change in real GDP is 3.693% and the change in 
unemployment is -3.458%. The sum of the change in 
labourproductivity and the change in the labour force (i.e. the growth 
rate requested to stabilize the Yώgt unemployment rate) averages 
1.749%. 
We use alternatively a simplified version of the first difference 
model and the gap model1. 
The elasticity of the unemployment rate / GDP averages -1.398 
over the period 2001-2015. The elasticity is strong and negative from 
2001 to 2009, then becomes positive between 2010 and 2015 when the 
unemployment rate reaches 10%, without possibly inferring that it is 
the natural rate of unemployment. 
The simplified model in first difference is written as follows: Δ𝑢𝑡 = 
+ βΔ𝑦𝑡 
                                                          
1  We use the OIC statistics database (OICStat) for real GDP rather than National 
Accounts series. Actually, the Algerian Statistical Office (ONS) compiles real GDP 
from 1989 constant price, which becomes obsolete. Other data come from Table A1 
(Appendix 1). Calculations are available upon request. 
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Where Δ𝑢𝑡 represents the average change in the unemployment 
rate over the period 2001-2015 and Δ𝑦𝑡 represents the average change 
in GDP growth rate over the same period. 
Hence: -3.458% = -0.936 (3.693%), where the multiplier (β) is very 
close to -1 (-0.936). 
The simplified gap model can be written: Ut – Ut-1 = – γ(Ygt – Yώgt) 
Where Ut – Ut-1is the average difference in the unemployment rate 
over the period 2001-2015, Ygt is the average change in GDP growth 
rate over the same period and Yώgtis the growth rate requested to 
stabilize the unemployment rate. 
Hence: -3.458% = -1.778 (3.693% -1.749%), where the multiplier (γ) 
is higher than 1 (1.778). 
With our simplified gap model, we obtain a comparable 
multiplieralthougha little higher than that (1.5) in the gap model that 
El Aynaoui and Ibourk (2016) apply over the same period (2000-2015). 
Figure 1 shows that real GDP varies in line with labour 
productivity, whereas the unemployment rate varies in line with the 
labour force.  
Figure 1: Okun’s law, labour force and labour productivity: the gap model 
 






Δ Real GDP  (2005  constant price)
Δ Unemployment rate
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Whether using the difference or the gap model, Okun’s law may 
prove a valid long-run relationship. However, it sheds little light 
upon the short-run pattern of unemployment. In this respect, Okun’s 
coefficient should not be confused with the short-run employment 
multiplier (Kahn, 1931); it cannot explain the change in 
unemployment rate. Hence, it is worth examining the role of 
employment policy schemes.  
3- EMPLOYMENT POLICY SCHEMES AND THE TREND IN 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
According to the literature review addressing the assessment issue 
of employment policies in Algeria, most studies are descriptive. The 
CNES (2002, 2010) provided two studies on employment policies 
assessment that did not include an impact assessment component. The 
World Bank (2010) conducted an assessment without assessing the 
impact on the labour market. The ILO undertook a comparative 
analysis of labour market intermediation in the three Maghreb 
countries (Barbier, 2007). In 2010, the ILO put together a synthesis of 
labour market policies for some Arab countries including Algeria 
(Musette 2014). Adair and Bellache (2008, 2009) assessed the policies 
tackling job creation in very small businesses (microenterprises), 
whereas Hammouda (2009) focused on the impact of employment 
policies from aggregate data rather than micro econometric analyses. 
Besides the fact that impact assessment is a hot political issue, 
uncoordinated various agencies provide only gross data that prove 
sometimes disparate and net flows are unavailable. Table A2 
(Appendix 2) lists the mechanisms implemented by the public 
authorities, under the auspices of two separate ministries whose 
various agencies intervene in the labour market: the Ministry of 
Labour, Employment and Social Security (MTESS) as well as the 
Ministry of National Solidarity and Family (MSNF).  
We examine successively the adjustment of the employment level 
resulting from labour market intermediation, from safety net 
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precarious contracts and from job creation generated by the 
promotion of very small businesses (microenterprises). 
3.1. Labour market intermediation  
The ANEM is in charge of supply and demand adjustment on the 
labour market. The trend in placements follows that of job vacancies, 
with a widening gap since 2004 (See Figure 2). According to the 
private sector absorbed three out of four placements in 2016, 90 
percent being fixed term contracts (ANEM, 2017). 
Beginning in 2008 and peaking in 2011, the DAIP (including its 
three components CID, CIP and CFI) supplied an annual average of 
245,000 fixed-term contracts to young people between 2008 and 2016. 
The duration of contracts being limited to two years (one year 
renewable once), inclusion remains uncertain. 
Over 2009-2016, the CTA provided an annual average of 33,000 
permanent contracts (SeeAppendix 1).  
Figure 2: Job demand, vacancies and job placements - 1997-2016 (thousands) 
 
Note: No data are available for 2014. 
Sources: ONS (2003-2014) ; ANEM (2016 ; 2017) 
3.2- Subsidised wage employment schemes 
Subsidised wage employment uncovers into four programmes: 
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2012 onwards) and PID (formerly CPE). They provided the most 
disadvantaged social strata an annual average of 342,300 temporary 
jobs over the period 1997-2014 (See Figure 3 and Table A2 in 
Appendix 2). The once predominant share of young people (below 30) 
benefiting from the DAIS and IAIG dropped dramatically over 2008-
2014. (CNES, 2016). 
Figure 3-Subsidisedwage employment: annual stock (2000-2014) 
 
Source: Table A1 (Appendix 1).  
3.3- Small business creation schemes  
Support for the start-up of small businesses results in one million 
projects funded by ANSEJ, CNAC and ANGEM,generating twice as 
much potential direct jobs (See Figure 4, Table 1 in Appendix 1 and 
Table A2 in Appendix 2).  
Together, the three agencies generate an average of nearly two jobs 
per project and an annual average of 141,000 jobs from 2005 to 2016, 
i.e. another 200,000 jobs created per year over the period 2008-2015, 
during which employment creation is particularly important up to 
2012. The annual number of jobs doubled by 2008 and tripled by 2011, 








Safety net jobs DAIP jobs CTA jobs
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Overall, the ANGEM scheme generates on average nearly twice 
the amount of job creation of the ANSEJ and about four times that of 
the CNAC. The average number of jobs per project is the lowest for 
the ANGEM (1.5) followed by the CNAC (2) and the ANSEJ (2.4). 
According to Seddiki (2013), the cost for a job from the ANSEJ 
scheme, including loan and interest charge would amount to DZD 
200,000 in 2004 and has increased over time. This cost is higher than 
that of the ANGEM scheme. Unfortunately, there are no available 
disaggregated data regarding expenditure on labour market policies 
that would enable the compilation of comparative costs (Adair and 
Bellache, 2008). 
Figure 4:  Small business job creation: annual stock (2000-2016) 
 
Note: Acronyms and content are explained in Table A2 (Appendix 2). 
Source: Table A1 (Appendix 1)and MIM (2016; 2017). 
In addition, it is worth looking at some comments regarding the 
rise in SMEs throughout the period under review. 
Job creation in SMEs induced by the 2001 SME Guidance Act 
would have tripled between 2000 and 2013. The average gross annual 
creation of more than 25,000 businesses (whose net balance is lower 
due to their mortality), which employs an average of 2.4 employees, 
generates an annual average of 60,000 gross jobs. Job creation occurs 
mainly in labour-intensive sectors with low productivity: services for 
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It should also be mentioned the role of the National Agency for 
Investment Development (ANDI) established in 2001. ANDI 
supported 48,363 projects generating 748,409 gross jobs from 2002 to 
2011, 15 jobs per project and almost an annual average of 75,000 jobs 
(Kadi, 2013). 
According to Kadi (2013), the contribution of SMEs to total 
employment would amount to almost one million jobs (981000). 
However, this contribution covers just over a quarter of the 3.55 
million net new jobs created over the 2001-2010 period. It remains to 
explain nearly three quarters of job creation. If we add the 250,000 
social net jobs created during the period (Appendix 1), we reach 1,231 
million. 
It therefore remains to explain nearly two-thirds of job creation, 
which results from the demand for work of existing companies and 
which corresponds in particular to the 900,000 job placements made 
by ANEM during this period (Appendix 3). 
The rest of the job created did not transit through intermediation 
on the labour market. 
3.4- The overall impact of employment policy schemes upon 
unemployment dynamics 
The contribution of job creation from the various schemes to the 
growth of the employed population is weakly significant from 2000 to 
2005 (4% of total employment) and is mainly limited to the social 
safety net. It has increased significantly since 2006, with the ramp-up 
of business creation schemes; accounting for nearly one in seven jobs 
in 2011 (14.82%) and another one in ten jobs in 2013 and 2014 (See 
Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Rising job creation and declining unemployment 
 
Source: Table A3 (Appendix 3). 
The macroeconomic assessment of employment policies is based 
on the estimated net effect of schemes upon employment and 
unemployment levels (impact variable) and the output level. Section 
two has already took care of the output level. Here, we compare the 
outcomes of these schemes according to the annual number of jobs 
created and the corresponding unemployment level. It should be 
reminded that the number of jobs created can be overstated and that 
the published data (in stock) are disparate and unadjusted. 
From 2000 to 2014, job creation schemes helped reducing 
unemployment. However, the impact seems quite low, since the 
halving of the unemployment rate occurs between 2000 (29.5%) and 
2005 (15.3%) and the impact does not persist beyond 2011, when the 
unemployment rate reaches 10%. 
Macroeconomic assessment points out two major deficiencies. 
First, labour market policies prove mildly efficient before 2008. 
Second, reinforced policies after 2008 are neither timely, because the 
drop in unemployment slows down, nor cost-effective in the light of 
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Hence, we look for another driver of the sharp decline in 
unemployment: expanding informal employment. 
4- INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY 
According to the principles of the UN System of National Accounts, 
unincorporated enterprises with less than ten employees are included 
in the household sector, which encapsulates the informal sector. 
However this ten employee threshold may be lowered to less than five 
employees in order to better grasp the informal sector (ILO, 2013).  
According to Business Register updates (Adair and Bellache, 2008; 
ONS, 2012), as well as the average number of jobs per business 
created by the ANSEJ (2.5 workers), ANGEM and CNAC (1.5 worker), 
most unincorporated enterprises in Algeria (below 10 workers) count 
actually less than five employees. In addition, the labour force surveys 
provide data regarding the size of the business, whereupon the 
distribution of informal workers can be calculated for most years  
In line with the ILO definition (ILO, 2013), informal employment 
of the non-agricultural employed population consists in informal 
employees of both formal and informal enterprises, as well as non-
wage earners of microenterprises (below 10 employees) in the 
informal sector, who are not registered with Social Security. 
4.1. Is informal employment a substitute for employment policy? 
Figure 6 displays two observations of the change in labour force 
from 2000 to 2013. First of all, the unemployed population experiences 
a sharp decline and varies inversely with the labour force. Then, 
informal employment increases significantly until 2010 and varies 
directly with the labour force. From 2003 onwards, the number of 
informal workers exceeds that of the unemployed, suggesting that 
growing informal employment absorbs unemployment. 
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Figure 6: Labour market adjustment:the absorption of unemployment 
withinformal employment 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation from ONS data. See Table 1 (Appendix 1). Units are thousands. 
Such absorption is evidenced by the joint variation in informal 
employment and labour force that follows exactly the same pattern 
from 2003 to 2011 (See Figure 7 and Table A3 in Appendix 3). 
Figure 7:Joint variation in informal employment and labour force 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation from ONS data. 
4.2- The impact of employment policy upon informal employment: a DiD 
experiment 
Informal employment in Algeria displays little barriers to entry 
and constitutes a last resort job position to escape unemployment 
(Souag et al. 2016a, 2016b). Hence, employment policies combating 
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Souag et al. (2018) analyse the effects upon informality of the 
Action Plan adopted by the Algerian government in 2008, being the 
second intervention on the labour market after the first one (1997) that 
occurred in a different context. Thanks to cross-sectional data from 
ONS labour force surveys over 1997-2013, they use the Difference in 
Difference estimator (henceforth DiD), which measures the difference 
between before and after labour market intervention. Comparing the 
average variation over time of the treatment group compared to a 
control group, they identify the impact of the Action Plan on the 
probability of obtaining an informal job for employees (informal 
employment), and the impact on the administrative and fiscal 
registration of theirbusiness for self-employed (informal sector). 
Following Souag et al (2016a, 2016b), all enterprises with staff below 
five employeesareconsidered informal, whereas those with at least five 
employees are formal. Formal enterprises are further subdivided into 
two groups: from five to nine employees and with at least 10 workers. 
The treatment variable in the model is being employed in a formal 
enterprise, looking separately at these two groups. 
As for the impact upon the administrative and tax registration of 
self-employed workers, the scheme promoting business creation 
targets both the informal and new businesses. Companies employing 
at least 10 workers stand as a control group, although it may not be 
appropriate because a share of the seal so includes informal 
employees.  
The mixed results show that the Action Plan contributed to the 
reduction of informality but with heterogeneous effects. It helped 
decreasing the chance of holding an informal job, but only in firms 
with at least 10 workers, whereas the effect is not significant for 
smaller businesses that constitute the bulk of the informal sector. For 
first-time jobseekers, the impact is not significant. The Action Plan 
also helped lessening the share of the informal sector. Business 
creation scheme had a significant impact on the administrative and 
fiscal registration of very small businesses employing one to four 
worker sas compared to companies employing at least 10 workers. 
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The impact is not significant for small businesses employing five to 
nine workers. Hence, the Action Plan proved more efficient 
improving compliance with tax registration than labour regulation 
upon workers’ social protection, the former being less expensive to 
implement than the latter.  
5- CONCLUSIONAND DISCUSSION 
We assessed the various employment policy schemes implemented 
in Algeria since 1997. One main limitation stems in particular from the 
fact that the data on job creation are unadjusted, allowing only the 
measurement of gross jobs rather than net flows.  
Beyond the controversy as for Okun’s law, the employment 
multiplier seems quite substantial (equal to one), but it does not help 
predicting the trend in unemployment. However, it suggests that the 
impact of labour market policies taming unemployment proved rather 
weak, whereas public spending spillovers may have positively 
influenced economic conditions. 
In the short and medium term, the macroeconomic impact of 
employment schemes on unemployment proves positive but weak. 
From a qualitative point of view, subsidised jobs are precarious and 
the failure of young micro-entrepreneurs should be included, 
implying that net job creation is below figures expected from for gross 
job creation. We ignore the individual impact and the issue of the 
medium-term inclusion of the beneficiaries must be addressed. 
Informal employment stands as a cheap substitute for formal jobs; 
its impact is positive upon the declining trend in unemployment. 
Informality remains almost immune as regards the very weak impact 
labour market schemes exert onformalising informal activities, whereas 
the improvement in informal businesses registration is not due to 
bureaucratic procedures alleviation, which did not take place yet. 
Public spending rocketed over the period and the substantial share 
devoted to employment policies has been rising. The Support Plan for 
economic recovery (2001-2004) amounted to DZD 14.76 billion; 
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whereas the Supplementary Support Plan for growth (2005-2009) 
spent over twice as much (i.e. DZD 33.36 billion) and expenditure 
multiplied by factor 2.5 (i.e. DZD 83.86 billion).as for the Five-year 
Development Plan (2010-2014).  
Despite the resources agencies absorb, limited information is 
available regarding operations and results. Little is known about the 
average cost per job created, the number of beneficiaries, dropout 
rates, and follow-up of beneficiaries and assessment of policy 
effectiveness in terms of job placement rates, impact on duration of 
unemployment and the quality of employment (Musette, 2014). 
Charmes (2010) pinpointed that social protection coverage 
according to social security schemes does not match that of 
labourforce surveys. Hence, a thorough understanding of disparate 
statistics is requested: Extending social protection should be better 
grounded upon more reliable data in order to tame informality with 
appropriate policies. 
Change in the magnitude of informal employment depends upon 
the pro- or counter-cyclical characteristics of its components according 
to economic upturn vs. slowdown. Informal wage employment is 
rather pro-cyclical, whereas self-employment and the informal sector 
may be counter-cyclical, shrinking with recovery and expanding with 
downturns. The role and share of informal employment is overlooked. 
Hence, a quarterly economic survey of SMEs would provide a better 
understanding of the impact of short-run economic growth upon 
informality. 
6- POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Missing monitoring policies should be enforced. A joint taskforce 
from Ministries in charge of employement policies should overcome 
the lack of coordination within the public administration. It should 
address specifically the informality issue, with the help of the 
National Statiscal Office (ONS) and provide a report every year under 
the auspices of the National Economic and Social Council (CNES). 
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The ‘stick and carrot’ policies implemented so far to enforce labour 
regulation and extend social protection should go on, alongside with 
monitoring and impact assessment devices. Incentives (granting 
credit, temporary tax exemption, improvement in doing business 
thanks to swift and limited number of procedures) go hand in hand 
with penalties (reinforced control from labour inspection and from 
banks). The balance must avoid the disincentive effect of extending 
social protection as a windfall benefit in the process of formalising 
informality, e.g. discouraging employers to hire formal employees. 
Such mechanisms should be tailored according to the heterogeneous 
segments they address: promoting income-generation activities to the 
working poor, extending social protection to non-permanent informal 
employees as well as to informal entrepreneurs. Targeting new labour 
market entrants, micro entrepreneurs and employees, may prove 
easier than changing the behaviour of already existing categories of 
informal workers. 
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Table A 1:  GDP, labour market and employment policy statistics (1997-2015) 
  1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Δ real GDP (2005 constant prices)   3 5.6 7.2 4.3 5.9 
Δunemployment rate   -8.39 -5.13 -8.49 -15.19 -23.88 
Δworking pop.    -1.41 -0.63 2.91 8 0.23 
Δ labour productivity   2.19 1.48 3.96 -10.6 2.66 
Working pop. 7,757,000 8,691,000 8,568,000 8,514,000 8,762,000 9,470,000 9,492,000 
Employed pop.  5,708,000 6,180,000 6,229,000 6,482,000 6,684,000 7,798,000 8,044,000 
Employment rate - 30.5% 29.8% 30.3% 30.4% 34.7% 34.7% 
Unemployed pop. 2,049,000 2,511,000 2,339,000 2,032,000 2,078,000 1,672,000 1,448,000 
Unemployment rate 26.4% 29.5% 27.3% 25.9% 23.7% 17.7% 15.3% 
Δemployed pop.   49,000 253,000 202,000 111,4000 246,000 
Δunemploy. pop   -172,000 -307,000 46,000 -406,000 -224,000 
Safety net jobs 355,305 220,013 241,787 251,355 264,463 320,580 303,342 
DAIP jobs - - - - - - - 
CTA jobs - - - - - - - 
Business jobs  28,735 20,152 19,631 14,771 19,111  
ANSEJ jobs  28,735 20,152 19,631 14,771 19,077 30,376 
ANGEM jobs - - - - - - 4,994 
CNAC jobs - - - - - 34 5,159 
Total safety net+ business jobs 355,305 248,748 261,939 270,986 279,234 339,691 343,871 
Subsidised jobs / working pop. (%) 4.58 2.86 3.05 3.18 3.18 3.59 3.62 
Safety net jobs /working pop. (%) 4.58 2.53 2.82 2.95 3.02 3.38 3.19 
Informal employ. 1,390,000 2,255,000 1,647,696 2,023,196 1,861,812 2,563,779 2,807,088 
% Informal employ. 29.22 36.5 37.5 31.21 36.01 42.3 41.8 
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Table A 1:  (Continued from preview page) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Δ real GDP (2005 constant prices) 1.7 3.4 2.4 1.6 3.6 
Δunemployment rate -19.61 12.19 -18.11 -9.73 1.96 
Δworking pop.  -6.51 3.47 3.47 2.22 2.53 
Δ labour productivity -7.76 6.7 -3.77 -1.9 0.8 
Working pop. 10,110,000 9,969,000 10,315,000 10,544,000 10,811,000 
Employed pop.  8,869,000 8,594,000 9,145,000 9,472,000 9,735,000 
Employment rate 37.2% 35.3% 37.0% 37.2% 37.6% 
Unemployed pop. 1,241,000 1,375,000 1,170,000 1,072,000 1,076,000 
Unemployment rate 12.3% 13.8% 11.3% 10.2% 10.0% 
Δemployed pop. 825,000 -275,000 551,000 327,000 263,000 
Δunemploy. pop -207,000 134,000 -20,500 -98,000 4,000 
Safety net jobs 434,658 468,043 664,228 714,574 757,489 
DAIP jobs - - 164,296 277,618 273,141 
CTA jobs - - - 8,027 16,937 
Business jobs      
ANSEJ jobs 24,500 22,685 31,418 57,812 60,132 
ANGEM jobs 33,331 25,847 63,148 91,101 77,934 
CNAC jobs 6,078 6,949 5,781 9,574 15,804 
Total safety net+ business jobs 498,567 523,524 764,575 873,061 911,361 
Subsidised jobs / working pop. (%) 4.93 5.25 7.41 8.28 8.43 
Safety net jobs /working pop. (%) 4.3 4.69 4.84 4.07 4.32 
Informal employ. 3,265,031 3,251,254 3,481,933 3,672,576 3,921,209 
% Informal employ. 45 43.8 41.42 41.71 45.6 
Les Cahiers du Cread, vol. 33 - n° 123  
156 
 
Table A 1:  (Continued from preview page) 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Δ real GDP (2005 constant prices) 2.9 3.4 2.8 3.8 3.8 
Δunemployment rate 0.1 10 10.91 8.16 13.34 
Δworking pop.  -1.37 7.13 4.72 -4.26 4.17 
Δ labour productivity 4.35 -2.4 -3.1 9.36 0.32 
Working pop. 10,662,000 11,423,000 11,963,000 11,453,000 11,931,000 
Employed pop.  9,599,000 10,170,000 10,788,000 10,239,000 10,594,000 
Employment rate 36.0% 37.4% 39.0% 36.4% 37.1 
Unemployed pop. 1,063,000 1,253,000 1,175,000 1,214,000 1,337,000 
Unemployment rate 10.0% 11.0% 9.8% 10.6% 11.2% 
Δemployed pop. -136,000 571,000 618,000 -549,000 355,000 
Δunemploy. pop -13,000 190,000 -78,000 39,000 162,000 
Safety net jobs 1130,578 828,444 961,431 766,441 664,228 
DAIP jobs 660,810 241,993 138,973 113,417 95,084 
CTA jobs 24,188 41,753 49,076 47,262 39,445 
Business jobs      
ANSEJ jobs 92,682 129,203 96,233 40,856 51,670 
ANGEM jobs 16,1417 219,641 166,053 176,315 126,152 
CNAC jobs 35,953 59,125 41,786 37,000 37,921 
Total safety net+ business jobs 1,420,631 1,236,413 1,265,503 1,020,612 879,971 
Subsidised jobs / working pop. (%) 13.32 10.82 9 8.91  
Safety net jobs /working pop. (%) 4.18 4.77 4.89 5.29  
Informal employ. 3,486944 3,494,756 3,604,726 
 
 
% Informal employ. 40.2 37.7 37.4 
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Table A 2. Labour Market Programmes 
Active: DAIP vocational inclusion assistance scheme, run by the Ministry of Labour (MTESS) consists in three categories: 
Program Target Duration 
CID (contrat d’insertion): 
Graduate inclusion contract 
First-time jobseekers, graduates of tertiary education 
or senior technicians who receive support for their 
sustainable recruitment, priority within public and 








Young, first-time jobseekers leaving secondary 
education orvocational education and training 
(VET)centers (CFPA)(including apprentices) 
Firms: 1 year, nonrenewable 
Public sector and administration: 
1 year, renewable 
CFI (contrat de formation-
insertion) Training inclusion 
contract 
Jobseekers without training or qualifications; they are 
placed in various work projects initiated by local 
authorities or various sectors for the duration of the 
project 
1 year, non-renewable 
CTA (contrat de travail aidé): 
Subsidised work contract 
Proposed when one of the above contracts comes to an 
end (and sometimes earlier if the employer agrees) 
 3 years 
 
  
Les Cahiers du Cread, vol. 33 - n° 123  
158 
 
Table A 2. Labour Market Programmes (Continued) 
Program Compensation. Comment 
CID (contrat d’insertion): Graduate 
inclusion contract 
University graduates:DZD 15,000 per month 
Senior technicians:DZD 10,000 per month 
The employer’s share of contributions to Social security 
is paid by the State. 
Replaces CPE (Contrats de Pré-
Emploi). 
CIP(contrat d’insertion professionnelle): 
Professional inclusion contract 
In firms: DZD 8,000per month 
In public and administration:DZD 6,000 per month 
The employer’s shareof contributions to Social security 
is paid by the State. 
At the end of the contract, 
ANEM may propose a 
subsidised work contract (CTA) 
in firms. In case of refusal, the 
person loses the right to remain 
in the CIP. 
CFI (contrat de formation-insertion) 
Trainingin clusion contract 
DZD 4,000 per month  
CTA (contrat de travail aidé): 
Subsidised work contract 
Labour costs shared between the State and employer: 
CID: University graduates(category 11,  index 498) 
1st year: 55%; 2nd year : 45%; 3rd year: 35% 
CID: Technicians (category 10, index, 453). 
1st year: 50%; 2nd year: 40%; 3rd year: 30% 
CIP contract (category 8, index 379). 
1st year: 47%;2nd year: 35% 
CFI contract. 53% of category 3, index 252 
 
Source: Authors, adapted from Musette (2014, p. 32). 
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Appendix 3 : 
Table A 3: Informal employment and labour market statistics (Continued) 
 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Informal employment  
(non-farming private sector) 
1,390 2,255 1,648 2,023 1,862 2,564 2,807 3,265 
Unemployed population 2,049 2,511 2,339 2,032 2,078 1,672 1,448 1,241 
Labour force 7,757 8,691 8,568 8,514 8,762 9,471 9,492 10,111 
Change in informal employment   -36.86 22.79 -7.98 37.7 9.49 16.31 
Change in labour force   -1.415 -0.63 2.91 8.08 0.232 6.51 
Table A 3: Informal employment and labour market statistics 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Informal employment  
(non-farming private sector) 
3,265 3,251 3,482 3,673 3,921 3,487 3,495 3,605 
Unemployed population 1,241 1,375 1,171 1,072 1,076 1,063 1,253 1,175 
Labour force 10,111 9,969 10,315 10,544 10,811 10,662 11,423 11,963 
Change in informal employment 16.31 0.42 7.09 5.47 6.77 -11.07 0.22 3.15 
Change in labour force 6.51 -1.39 3.47 2.22 2.53 -1.38 7.14 4.73 
Source: Souag et al (2018). Units are thousands. 
